



# **Threat Hunting**

Tu mejor arma para evitar tu próximo gran incidente de ransomware (¡y otros!)

Readiness · Detection · Response



### Index

**What is Threat Hunting?** 

**Intelligence at the Core** 

**How Does Threat Hunting Work?** 

**Summary. Why Can't You Live Without It?** 


**How Can We Help You?** 




Depth

# Where Does Threat Hunting Fit?

#### **Detection & Response Maturity**



Al Workflow Automation





# What is Threat Hunting (TH)?

The goal of threat hunting is not only to find more security incidents but to **improve automated detection** capabilities over time. David Bianco.

To catch intrusions in progress, rather than after attackers have completed their objectives and done worse damage to the organization. SANS Institute.

Threat Hunting = Incident Response – Incident

Threat Hunting is all about Proactive Detection




# What is Threat Hunting (TH)?

Able to detect unknown threats

Wide variety of TTP and Threats covered

Intelligencedriven Focus on what cannot be detected by other means







# Why is Threat Hunting Necessary?






### **Reactive Detection**

What you think you are detecting

VS

What you are detecting







### **Reactive Detection**

#### **Reactive detection problems:**

- Based on alerts.
- High technology dependency.
- High False Positives rate.
- Threat Actors know how to bypass a SOC.



### **Proactive Detection: Threat Hunting**



TH gives you the protection you think you already have (but you don't)



### **Some Real Statistics**

Attacks that cannot be detected by reactive detection are exponentially growing. E.g. interative intrusions have grown 55% in the last year (CrowdStrike)

Ransomware, the main threat nowadays, is the Top 2 threat that hunters detect in a daily basis (SANS)


Resources spent on remediation are reduced 39% in organizations doing Threat Hunting (SANS)






# Close Up: CTI









# Now, We Know Who is Going To Attack You

### The World has Changed: Threat Intelligence

~ 500 Threat Actors (TA)

Cyber Threat Intelligence

Geography

Vertical


Campaigns

~ 20 TA

May affect you



# And We Also Know How They Will Attack You



Internal Intel.

Reports

Research



TP (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures)

A parametrization of how TA attack

# MITRE

Tactic	Technique ID	Technique
TA0001 - Initial Access	T1566	Phishing
TA0006 - Credential Access	T1003	Credential Dumping
TA0004 - Privilege Escalation	T1068	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
TA0007 - Discovery	T1082	System Information Discovery





### **Use Case: Lockbit**

Top 3 Ransomware. >250% in 2022

Continuous Evolution
New tools -> new detections

LATAM / EMEA / NA
Main targets




#### References with the information and graphs of this use case:

**Logpoint:** https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/hunting-lockbit-variations-using-logpoint/ **America's Cyber Defense Agency:** https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-165a




### **Use Case: Lockbit**



**Extracted from Logpoint report about LockBit** 



### **How Does TH Work?**





### CTI

**Internal Intelligence** 

Previous incidents, internal database...



**External Intellingence** 

Research about Lockbit: latest campaigns, latest IOA, reports...

e.g: https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/hunting-lockbit-variations-using-logpoint/



Infrastructure

**How can YOU detect this threat?** 

Hardware, tools...




### CTI


- **Execution** use of mshta.exe to execute LockBit masquerading as an HTML Application and through scheduled tasks.
- Privilege Escalation User account control bypass via COM like cmlua.dll or cmstplua.dll.
   Using defender binary mpcmdrun.exe to side load malicious DLL.
- Persistence modifying registry Run\RunOnce keys.
- **Defense Evasion** Stops defender logging, disables real-time and tamper protection, uninstalls antivirus and malware protection like defender, third party vendor if present. The malware also cleans the event log and further prevents the writing of any new log.
- Credential harvesting Enabling Wdigest authentication mechanism to easily retrieve clear text passwords.
- Lateral Movement Enables RDP in the compromised system, psexec to remotely deploy malware
- Exfiltration Utilizes Stealbit malware to exfiltrate.
- Impact Deletes Shadow copy, modifies boot configuration data to disable auto recovery, and various services and tasks are killed before encryption.

# This information will be used by TH Team



### **How Does TH Work?**







### **Queries Creation**

### Information from CTI is translated to hypothesis and queries.

Hypothesis: Lockbit affiliate modifies Run\RunOnce keys to get persistence


Microsoft Defender 365

// Persistence via RunOnce, RunSerivces y RunServicesOnce
DeviceRegistryEvents
|where ActionType == "RegistryKeyCreated"
or RegistryKey contains "RunOnce"
or RegistryKey contains "RunServices"
or RegistryKey contains "RunServicesOnce"

Note: this is not a real query to detect lockbit



### **How Does TH Work?**





# Investigation

label=Registry label=Set label=Value

target\_object IN

- "\*\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\*",
- "\*\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices\*",
- "\*\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\*",
- "\*\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices\*",
- "\*\software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell\*",
- "\*\software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\*",
- "\*\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders\*"] -user IN

#### EXCLUDED\_USERS

100 account\_type channel 100 event source 100 opcode device\_category 100 100 event\_type process\_guid record 100 host 100 keyword 100 image 100 target\_object log\_level version 100 100 norm\_id

### **End-to-end investigations**

\_\_name=Windows Servers \col\_type=syslog \sig\_id=234356 \rightarrow repo\_name=AD \severity=2 \set | domain=NT AUTHORITY \set | event\_type=SetValue \set | process=C:\Program Files (x86)\Micr... \set | event\_category=Registry value set (rule: R... \set | host=SiC-VENUS.sigintcorp.tk \set | event\_source=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon \set | rule=T1060,RunKey \set | account\_type=User \set | channel=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Op... \set | col\_ts=2022/09/11 11:52:06 \set |

collected\_at=LogPoint | detail="C:\Program Files (x86)\Mic... | device\_category=OS | event\_ts=2022/09/11 11:52:20 | execution\_process\_id=2444 | execution\_thread\_id=4632 | guid=(5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06... | image=C:\Program Files (x86)\Micr... | keyword=9223372036854775808 | log\_level=INFO | logpoint\_name=LogPoint | message=Registry value set | norm\_id=WindowsSysmon | opcode=info | opcode\_value=0 | process\_guid=(fe4dedcb-c98a-631d-b816-00... | process\_id=8988 | record=3623310 |

source\_module=in\_win v | source\_module\_type=im\_msvistalog v | target\_object=HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Win... v | task\_value=13 v | user\_id=\$-1-5-18 v | utc\_ts=2022/09/11 06:07:18 v | version=2 v |

{"EventTime": "2022-09-11T17:37:18.756470+05:45", "Hostname": "SIC-

VENUS.sigintcorp.tk", "Keywords": "9223372036854775808", "EventType": "SetValue", "SeverityValue": 2, "Severity": "INFO", "EventID": 13, "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon", "ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-

06F5698FFBD9)", "Version": 2, "TaskValue": 13, "OpcodeValue": 0, "RecordNumber": 3623310, "ExecutionProcessID": 2444, "ExecutionThreadID": 4632, "Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", "Domain": "NT AUTHORITY", "AccountName": "SYSTEM", "UserID": "S-1-5-

18", "AccountType": "User", "Message": "Registry value set:\r\nRuleName: T1060,RunKey\r\nEventType: SetValue\r\nUtcTime: 2022-09-11 11:52:18.751\r\nProcessGuid: {fe4dedcb-c98a-631d-b816-

00000003100}\r\nProcessId: 8988\r\nImage: C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\WebView\\Application\\105.0.1343.33\\Installer\\setup.exe\r\nTargetObject: HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Current\Version\\RunOnce\\msedge: cleanup\_(F3017226-FEZA-4295-8BDF-

00C3A9A7E4C5\r\nDetails: \"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\EdgeWebView\\Application\\105.0.1343.33\\Installer\\setup.exe\" --msedgewebview --delete-old-versions --system-level --verbose-logging --on-logon\r\nUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM", "Category": "Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)", "Opcode": "Info", "RuleName": "T1060,RunKey", "UtcTime": "2022-09-11 11:52:18.751", "ProcessGuid": "{fe4dedcb-c98a-631d-b816-


 $00000003100\}", "ProcessId": "8988", "Image": "C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\105.0.1343.33\\nstaller\setup.exe", "TargetObject": "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\\msedge_cleanup_{F3017226-FE2A-4295-88DF-}$ 

00C3A9A7E4C5}\*, "Details": \"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\EdgeWebView\\Application\\105.0.1343.33\\Installer\\setup.exe\" --msedgewebview --delete-old-versions --system-level --verbose-logging --on-logon", "User": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM", "EventReceivedTime": "2022-09-

11T17:37:20.623990+05:45", "SourceModuleName": "in\_win", "SourceModuleType": "im\_msvistalog"}



### **How Does TH Work?**





# **Threat Hunting: Not Just Proactive Detection**

#### TH is not only about detecting Threat Actors, you get value from it everyday

- Bad practices: passwords in clear text, incorrect use of admin users, PuP...
- SOC Empowerment: improve your automatic detections.
- Red Team / Purple Team: detect the security issues they are exploiting.
- EIR: in case of incident, must have support.



# **Doing Threat Hunting Is Not Just to Hunt**

- Strategy: how we identify actors, create hypothesis, workflows...
- **CTI:** to be up-to-date with Threat Actors and campaigns.
- DFIR: to get deeper knowledge and analysis capabilities.
- Malware: to exploit Threat Actors tools and detect them.
- Extensive Knowledge and experience: for good detection capabilities.





### Threat Hunting is a Must-Have



Threat Intelligence and Proactive Detection start to be part of regulatory compliance such as ISO or DORA.



> 80% of organizations using TH have reduced the resources used for incidents remediation.



It is the only way to be protected against many different threats such as ransomware that reactive detection cannot detect.

That's why more than 51% or organizations have formally introduced a Threat Hunting function

2024 SANS Threat Hunting Survey



# **Empower All Your Areas**

#### **Much more that detecting Threat Actors**

**Protection** 

Detect weak configs / bad practices

Helps to evaluate tools such as EDR

May discover potential vulnerabilities

Support to improve configs and tools

**Detection** 

Use of Cyber Threat Intelligence

In-depth manual analysis of threats

Improve automated detections

Enhance teams: SOC, Purple/Red Team

Response

Reduce dwell time to zero in Response

Support other teams during EIR

Be a part of Incident Response

Enhance teams: SOC, Purple/Red Team



# Very Easy To Make It Happen

#### We have the knowledge

Queries

**Experts** 

Technology

#### You have the tools



Just give us access to your platforms and we will start today



### **Compromise Assessment**

**One-Shot Threat Hunting for Specific objectives** 

Incident Response related

Maint Threat Actors and TTP


M&A


Bad practices *l*Misconfigurations
identification





### How Can We Help You?









# **Threat Hunting Services**

#### Managed Threat Hunting (MTH)

Proactive and continuous Threat Hunting services for a wide range of threats detection.



# Change your cybersecurity strategy

From reactive to proactive, protecting yourself better in case of incident.

# We can be the team or complement your team

We can integrate our team and processes with your SOC, CERT, TH Team, etc.

#### Compromise Assessment (CA)



One shot Threat Hunting to cover a specific goal (Incident Response related, Threats Actor, M&A).

# Review your data to detect past or current breaches

We provide you with the security of not having breaches

#### Complement your CyberSecurity strategy

Complement for Red Team exercises, post Incident Response, etc.

**Different options and prices** 

**Maximum flexibility** 


At the vanguard of threats

**Quick start** 



### L3 Escalation


We help you to resolve your most advanced tool alerts, using all our DFIR / TH expertise to investigate then when your SOC or internal team is not capable





### **Alerts Review**


A SOCless solution to take advantage of your tools





### **SOC Empowerment**


Create new use cases for you SOC, the latest threats and the power of our Threats
Hunting services, so your SOC can monitor them 24/7





# **CA Incident Response Related**

Benefit from One eSecurity Threat Hunting expertise in one-shot. Example:





# **Tailoring The Solution**

Any devices (e.g: routers)

Other Data Sources (e.g: network traffic) Any other tools (e.g: firewalls)

Different Types of CA



### **About Our Services**

Fortune 500 customers

Hunting about 100k assets daily

Continuous Threat Hunting is crucial for the early detection of potential security threats & vulnerabilities

**51% of organizations** have formally defined Threat Hunting methodologies

SANS 2024 Threat Hunting Survey

#### **Feedback from our customers**

One eSecurity is detecting Threats that other service providers are not detecting One eSecurity provides services that other service providers cannot (netflows, Ciscos)

One eSecurity is giving useful extra information about threats under investigation



### Historias de éxito



#### Client 1

After an incident through their network devices attended by One eSecurity, we started a Threat Hunting service with EDR, SIEM, and some hunting types very uncommon and customer oriented, such as config. files in network devices and netflows, detecting different vector attacks before the intrusion was confirmed and wrong configurations in new network devices before they were exploited.

#### Client 2

Customer with an EDR and a SIEM that needs help to complement its team and get a more proactive perspective. We helped them by reviewing the tools alerts, investigating the most complex ones, and continuously introducing new queries in their platforms to cover their needs. They reduced the internal team needed and we helped stop some attacks with the queries we were introducing in the EDR.

#### Client 3

Fortune 500 bank customer with multiple EDRs and tenants in many different countries. With our automation, we have been able to hunt in hundreds of thousands of assets and detect different attacks.





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